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PROBATE LAW—A NEW GUARDIAN ANGLE: A PROPOSED CHANGE TO
ARKANSAS’S PUBLIC POLICY ON GUARDIANSHIP FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a young man eagerly awaiting his eighteenth birthday so he
can vote—a traditional American rite of passage.1 What characteristics or
conditions might prevent his participation in this general right? If he is diagnosed with an intellectual disability, would he be considered inherently incapable of meaningful participation in politics? What if he needed help
managing his finances?2 What if his family helped him make important decisions? Would it matter if a court authorized his parents to make decisions
for him? Would a court grant such authority if the person was capable of
voting?3
For one young man, along with countless others, his right to vote was
automatically revoked when a court appointed his parents as his legal guardians based on a mental incapacity.4 Though disappointed, he used the democratic process to change his state’s law so that he, and others similarly situated, could petition a court to retain—or regain—the right to vote, regardless
of guardianship needs.5 He recruited others to support his cause and successfully lobbied for the change in his state.6 The system that excluded his direct
participation was permanently changed because of his efforts.7 His story is
about progress, but it also raises significant questions about guardianships 8
1. Dave Hawkins, Court Grants 25 Year Old Right to Vote, 17 THE NAVIGATOR 1, 1
(Aug.
11,
2012),
http://pilotparents.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Navigator-Fall2012.pdf.
2. Deanna Pan, Protecting the Voting Rights of People with Mental Disabilities,
MOTHER JONES (Nov. 5, 2012), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/11/voting-rightsmental-disabilities/.
3. See Bazelon Ctr. for Mental Health Law, Autistic Self-Advocacy Network, Nat’l
Disability Rights Network, & Schulte, Roth & Zabel LLP, Vote. It’s Your Right: A Guide to
the Voting Rights of People with Mental Disabilities, 28–52 (2016), http://www.bazelon.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/01/voting-rights-guide-2016.pdf (hereinafter Bazelon Ctr. for Mental Health Law) (outlining and comparing the right to vote for people with mental disabilities
by state).
4. Pan, supra note 2.
5. Hawkins, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. In this note “guardian” or “guardianship” describes the court-appointed person or
relationship granting authority to advocate for and make decisions on behalf of an assigned
ward. A guardian is a person appointed by a court “to have the care and custody of the person
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for people with intellectual disabilities.9 This man’s story reveals a struggle
for independence.10 Individuals with intellectual disabilities experience
unique challenges to their rights, often to rights unconsciously assumed by
others.11
Guardianship is the most restrictive form of advocacy for individuals
with intellectual disabilities.12 The implications of a guardianship are harsh
and unforgiving.13 People with intellectual disabilities face exceptional challenges in areas of self-determination, competency, presumption of a permanent need for guardianship, and limited acceptance of alternatives to traditional guardianships.14 Policies among states are inconsistent, but typically
impose broad limitations on the rights of persons subjected to a guardianship.15 Alternatives to guardianship, such as supported decision-making, are
becoming more accepted.16
This note considers Arkansas’s current guardianship policy and proposes changes inspired by developments in civil rights and successful reforms.17 Part II examines historical developments that shaped today’s guardor of the estate, or both, of an incapacitated person.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-101(3) (Supp.
2017).
9. An “incapacitated person” includes persons with disabilities affecting decisionmaking skills. Id. § 28-65-101(5)(A). For the purposes of this note, various phrasing may be
used synonymously with “individuals with intellectual disabilities” such as “individuals with
developmental disabilities” or “people with disabilities.” Some language may have implications beyond the scope of this analysis. Unless otherwise noted, all references to “disabilities”
should be considered within a broad range of abilities and without regard to specific diagnoses.
10. See generally Pan, supra note 2 (noting the unique challenges to voting experienced
by people with disabilities).
11. Lila H. Swann, Changing Times—Changing Minds: The Importance of Fighting for
Higher Constitutional Protection for People with Intellectual Disabilities, 12 CHARLESTON L.
REV. 295, 316 (2018).
12. Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision Making as
a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81
U. COLO. L. REV. 157, 168–70 (2010).
13. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP: TOWARD
ALTERNATIVES THAT PROMOTE GREATER SELF-DETERMINATION, 1, 36–37 (March 22, 2018),
https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Guardianship_Report_Accessible.pdf.
14. Id. at 36–37. See generally STACY CLIFFORD SIMPLICAN, THE CAPACITY CONTRACT:
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND THE QUESTION OF CITIZENSHIP (U. of Minn. Press 2015), for
an in-depth discussion on the historical presumptions of incapacity for people with disabilities and the continued struggle for recognition even among self-proclaimed advocates for
people with disabilities.
15. Sally Balch Hurme, Current Trends in Guardianship Reform, 7 MD. J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 143, 144–45 (1995-1996); see also Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law,
supra note 3, at 28–52 (outlining and comparing the right to vote in different states).
16. Robert Dinerstein et al., Emerging International Trends and Practice in Guardianship Law for People with Disabilities, 22 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 435, 437–42 (2016).
17. See discussion infra Parts II, IV.
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ianship policies.18 Part III explores a recent trend toward a universal recognition of capacity.19 Part IV proposes changes to Arkansas’s existing policies
and legislation.20 This note concludes with the assertion that Arkansas
should join other states in promoting self-reliance and independence for
people with varying support needs.21 The proposed changes emphasize a
new perspective for advocates and would guide judicial processes to prevent
unnecessary guardianships.
II. THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF TRADITIONAL GUARDIANSHIPS
Since its inception under English common law and its adoption in the
United States, guardianships for people with intellectual disabilities have
been the subject of significant reformation and debate.22 Society has viewed
guardianships for people with disabilities as benevolent, though skepticism
emerges from time to time.23 Fundamental principles that formed traditional
guardianships, like protectionism and the “best interest” standard, still influence guardianships today.24 As society develops and experiments with different forms of advocacy, less restrictive alternatives to guardianship have
become more practical.25
A.

Historical Developments of Guardianship Policies

Modern guardianship policies originated under the English common
law doctrine of parens patriae, which considered the government a protector
for the vulnerable.26 This paternalistic system was originally a public service
for orphans and disabled persons.27 This English concept influenced early

18. See discussion infra Part II.
19. See discussion infra Part III. See generally Leslie Salzman, Using Domestic Law to
Move Toward a Recognition of Universal Legal Capacity for Persons with Disabilities, 39
CARDOZO L. REV. 521, 532–41 (2017) (reviewing political progress for people with intellectual disabilities and considering areas in need of more reform).
20. See discussion infra Part IV.
21. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 135–37 (listing less restrictive
supports for people with intellectual disabilities); see also discussion infra Part IV.
22. Nicole M. Arsenault, Start with a Presumption She Doesn’t Want to Be Dead: Fatal
Flaws in Guardianships of Individuals with Intellectual Disability, 35 LAW & INEQ. 23, 26–
33 (2017).
23. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 20.
24. Id. at 53–64.
25. See generally id. at 64 (reviewing reforms in guardianship and a shift away from
surrogate decision-making as alternatives gain popularity).
26. John J. Regan, Protective Services for the Elderly: Commitment, Guardianship, and
Alternatives, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569, 575 (1972).
27. Arsenault, supra note 22, at 26–27.
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guardianship law in the United States.28 Principles like parens patriae are
still reflected in public service programs where the government “protects”
vulnerable people.29 The state may still directly fill the role of guardian
through a governmental agency, often referred to as a public guardian.30
Until recently, guardianships were always established as plenary with
few limits on the powers granted.31 Additional forms of guardianships, like
partial and limited guardianships, were developed to continue to provide
support to the person but with fewer restrictions on individual rights.32 Limited guardianships gained popularity for people with intellectual disabilities;
this type of guardianship purports to limit the scope of a guardian’s authority by withholding all powers not explicitly granted in the court order.33 A
limited guardianship acknowledges that capacity may be specific to certain
circumstances.34 A limited guardianship should specifically state any authority that is granted to the guardian; powers that are not assigned to the guardian are retained by the ward.35 Today, many states have a statutory preference for the use of limited, rather than plenary, guardianships.36
When done correctly, limited guardianships are more burdensome for
courts and petitioners.37 An effective limited guardianship narrowly describes the extent of the guardianship order.38 This individualization protects
personal autonomy based on the person’s actual abilities and needs.39 Unfortunately, courts tend to err on the side of caution.40 A court may wish to prevent future expenses incurred by parties to expand the guardian’s powers or
the court may view additional grants of authority as greater protection for an
28. Hal Fliegelman & Debora C. Fliegelman, Giving Guardians the Power to Do Medicaid Planning, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 344 (1997).
29. See Arsenault, supra note 22, at 27.
30. Windsor C. Schmidt, Guardianship for Vulnerable Adults in North Dakota: Recommendations Regarding unmet Needs, Statutory Efficacy, and Cost Effectiveness, 89 N.D. L.
REV. 77, 80 (2013); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-702 (Supp. 2017) (Arkansas’s statutory guidelines for public guardianship).
31. Lawrence A. Frolik, Promoting Judicial Acceptance and Use of Limited Guardianship, 31 STETSON L. REV. 735, 739 (2002).
32. Id. at 747.
33. Id. at 748–49.
34. Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote:
The Effect of Mental Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, 947
(2007).
35. See generally Salzman, supra note 12, at 179 (considering the use of a limited
guardianship to authorize at home care or housekeeping services for a woman in need of
assistance).
36. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 35–36; Salzman, supra note 12, at
177–78.
37. Frolik, supra note 31, at 749.
38. Id. at 748–49.
39. Id. at 748–50.
40. Salzman, supra note 12, at 174–75.
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alleged incapacitated person.41 On the other hand, the alleged incapacitated
person may have been absent from the proceedings or may not have presented opposing evidence.42 In practice, limited guardianships tend to bestow a broad range of powers, which contradicts its intended purpose.43
When limited guardianships have the same provisions regardless of individual needs, rights are unnecessarily affected, often in the name of efficiency.44
B.

Reforms Paved the Way for a Greater Change in Advocacy and Civil
Rights for Individuals with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities

Questions about the rights of people with disabilities became more
prevalent as society’s perception of equality became more inclusive.45 Public
attention, particularly negative attention, spurred the evolution of public
policy and laid the foundation for increased political power for people with
developmental disabilities.46
1.

Public Criticism Sparked Initial Guardianship Reformation

Guardianships, limited or otherwise, received criticism for implications
to the constitutional rights of those subjected to them.47 Though theoretically
meant to protect, guardianships, at best, expose a person to the will of another and, at worst, revoke all vestiges of personhood.48 Even when guardians act in good faith, their decisions leave a ward powerless and subject to
the will of another person.49 Jenny Hatch, a woman with Down’s Syndrome,
described her experience with guardianship as feeling unhappy, ignored, and
having her rights taken away.50 Before being placed under the authority of a
guardian, Jenny lived in the community and had a roommate; she was active
41. Id.
42. Id; Frolik, supra note 31, at 743–44 (considering possible reasons why courts grant
broad powers to guardians).
43. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 104.
44. See id. at 104–05 (discussing overly broad guardianship orders); see Frolik, supra
note 31, at 749 (discussing the persistence of broad guardianship orders).
45. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 55–64.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 70–71 (briefly discussing exploitation and abuse by guardians); id. at 101–
02 (calling guardianship a “double-edged sword” that seeks to protect but at the cost of fundamental rights). See also Salzman, supra note 12, at 168–70 (describing the isolating results
of a guardianship that discourages engagement in a range of normal interactions a person
encounters on a daily basis).
49. Salzman, supra note 12, at 168–70.
50. Jenny Hatch, Jenny in Her Own Words, THE JENNY HATCH JUST. PROJECT,
http://jennyhatchjusticeproject.org/jennys_words (last visited Mar. 10, 2019).
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in her church and had a job working at a local thrift shop.51 After a guardianship was established, she was removed from her home, friends, and community.52 She was placed in a group home and was denied meaningful participation in decisions about her own life.53 Jenny’s story is just one example of
the drastic consequences of broad guardianship powers.
Guardianships have significant, long-term implications on individual
rights.54 A person who is subjected to a guardianship loses the right to make
decisions and becomes detached from the decision-making process.55 More
troubling, a deficit in one area of life can lead to a guardianship that affects
all areas.56 A guardianship assigns many decisions about daily life to another
person like housing, education, work opportunities, association with others,
travel, medical treatments, and financial decisions.57 Though limited guardianships have been widely accepted and aim to preserve individual rights,
their practical use does not hold up against the broad claims of promoting
independence and, as a result, are inexplicably similar to a traditional plenary guardianship.58
Though no special scrutiny is required under an equal protection analysis,59 guardianship involves questions about due process and constitutional
rights, which are afforded generous protection from arbitrary infringement.60
51. Sean Burke, Person-Centered Guardianship: How the Rise of Supported DecisionMaking and Person-Centered Services Can Help Olmstead’s Promise Get Here Faster, 42
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 873, 875–76 (2016); id. at 886.
52. Id. at 875–76.
53. Hatch, supra note 50.
54. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 36–37 (noting that guardianship rarely ends because the individual’s rights are restored or reevaluated).
55. Salzman, supra note 12, at 167–68.
56. See id. at 158–60 (discussing a case that warranted legal intervention, in the best
interest of the person, based on an inability to adequately clean, which presented a health and
safety risk).
57. See id. at 167–68 (listing some, but certainly not all, of the decisions assigned to a
guardian that affect a ward’s daily life and noting the expansive powers a guardian holds);
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 27–30 (listing some of the rights affected
by a guardianship order).
58. Salzman, supra note 12, at 174–76 (discussing the tendency of courts to grant broad
guardianship orders).
59. See Swann, supra note 11, at 304–12 (discussing the Court’s holding in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), and the use of the rational basis
standard of review for an equal protection analysis for people with intellectual disabilities and
the determination that people with intellectual disabilities are not members of a suspect class,
which would require a heightened scrutiny).
60. See generally Salzman, supra note 12, at 160–70 (discussing the impact of guardianships on a ward’s civil rights); Samantha Alexandra Crane, Is Guardianship Reform
Enough—Next Steps in Policy Reforms to Promote Self-Determination Among People with
Disabilities, 8 J. INT’L AGING L. & POL’Y 177, 184–86 (2015) (expanding on the civil rights
implications and giving examples of constitutionally protected rights being infringed upon by
guardianships).
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Guardianship was criticized following a series of exposés detailing the denials of due process during guardianship proceedings.61 According to the article, many alleged incapacitated persons did not even attend the guardianship
hearing.62 Congress attempted to restructure statutory guidelines to correct
this blatant disregard of constitutional rights but, ultimately, the revisions
minimally addressed the underlying problems of the systematic prejudices
experienced by people with intellectual disabilities.63 It can be difficult to
confidently differentiate between a need for guardianship and the need for a
less restrictive option, particularly concerning the viability and longevity of
an alternative.64 This gray area is especially problematic for individuals with
developmental or intellectual disabilities.65
2.

Olmstead’s Implications on Guardianship Reformation

In Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, two women with intellectual disabilities were voluntarily admitted to a state hospital for treatment.66 They were
kept in inpatient treatment even though they could have been treated in a
community setting.67 The institutionalization was, in part, due to the lack of
appropriate community-based supports available.68 The Court found that
their continued institutionalization was a form of segregation.69 This decision became a catalyst for change in the treatment and perception of individuals with intellectual disabilities.70
Concepts in Olmstead have been applied to guardianship standards and
to assumptions about capacity.71 The Court in Olmstead considered the effects of segregation, like the persistence of stereotypes and the denial of
basic social interactions.72 Similarly, guardianships deprive individuals from
61. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 54–55; Fred Bayles & Scott
McCartney, Guardians of the Elderly: An Ailing System Part I: Declared ‘Legally Dead’ by a
Troubled System, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 19, 1987), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1987/
Guardians-of-the-Elderly-An-Ailing-System-Part-I-Declared-Legally-Dead-by-a-TroubledSystem/id-1198f64bb05d9c1ec690035983c02f9f (critiquing the general process of obtaining
guardianship).
62. Bayles, supra note 61.
63. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 55–57.
64. Salzman, supra note 12, at 177–78.
65. See Arsenault, supra note 22, at 53–54.
66. Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 594–97.
69. Id. at 600.
70. See Salzman, supra note 12, at 192.
71. Id. at 193–94.
72. Leslie Salzman, New Perspectives on Guardianship and Mental Illness: Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness—A Legal and Appropriate Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U.
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 283–84 (2011).
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meaningful participation in their own lives.73 Based on these social implications, some advocates expand the integration mandate beyond community
services to include the decision-making process.74 These advocates reason
that if guardianship results in isolation, then guardianship is a form of segregation;75 if guardianship is a form of social segregation, then guardianship
contradicts the integration mandate.76
3.

Mental Health Implications of Guardianship and Motivations for
Reform in Advocacy

Guardianship is a legal and social label indicating that a person is “incapable or unworthy of participation in civic and social activities.”77 When a
guardian has the ultimate authority to make decisions, the person served is
unlikely to be encouraged to participate in the decision-making process—or
worse, removed from the process entirely, creating an isolating and segregating effect.78 Although limited guardianships have become widely accepted, in reality, one person is still granted legal authority to make a broad
range of decisions for another person.79
Because guardianships remove the person from the decision-making
process, the person affected is unlikely to provide input and, based on assumptions of incapacity, any input is likely to be minimized.80 When subjected to guardianship, a person may experience what has been referred to as
“constructive isolation.”81 This isolation occurs when a perceived incapacity
affects a person’s communications and social involvement.82 Opportunities
73. Id.
74. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 119.
75. See Salzman, supra note 72, at 283; Crane, supra note 60, at 184–87.
76. See generally Salzman, supra note 12, at 193–95 (expanding the integration mandate
to guardianship); Salzman, supra note 72, at 283 (considering the similar effects of institutionalization and guardianship).
77. Salzman, supra note 19, at 527.
78. Salzman, supra note 12, at 168–70 (illustrating disengagement in different areas of
life based on perceived incapacity). See generally Burke, supra note 51, at 875–76 (discussing the social impacts on persons subjected to guardianships).
79. Salzman, supra note 12, at 169–70.
80. See Burke, supra note 51, at 886–88 (citing Elspeth Slayter Recevik, Twinkies for
Breakfast: Implementing the Dignity of Risk for Adults with Intellectual Disability,
DISABILITYINFO.ORG (Feb. 12, 2014), http://blog.disabilityinfo.org/?p=3928) (considering an
example of the tension between a well-meaning decision-maker and the person served when
the parties disagree); Salzman, supra note 12, at 168–170 (describing the isolation that results
from a guardianship).
81. Salzman, supra note 12, at 167–70.
82. Id. See also Crane, supra note 60, at 192–93; Dorothy Squatrito Millar, Guardianship Alternatives: Their Use Affirms Self-Determination of Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities, 48(3) EDUC. AND TRAINING IN AUTISM AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 291, 292
(2013) (discussing how a guardianship affects self-determination).
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to practice decision-making skills are imperative to the development of independence and self-reliance.83 Research indicates that practicing autonomy
and self-determination, even on a limited basis, can cultivate decisionmaking skills and greatly impact self-confidence.84 As a safeguard against
these negative effects, a person’s rights should only be restricted to the extent absolutely necessary.85
C.

Even Guardianship, as the Most Restrictive Option with Significant
Impacts on Fundamental Rights, Has Gaps in Protection That Create
Vulnerabilities to Abuse and Exploitation

Even with a court-appointed protector, people with disabilities are still
vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. States have inconsistent expectations
and policies for managing appointed guardians.86 Despite the substantial
impact on the person deemed vulnerable and incapable, guardianship has
surprisingly little oversight and minimal accountability.87

83. Diane M. Browder et al., Using a Person-Centered Approach in Community-Based
Instruction for Adults with Developmental Disabilities, 7.3 J. OF BEHAV. EDUC. 519, 521–22
(1997). See also Nina Kohn, Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111, 1114–15, 1138–39 (2013) (discussing the impact of decreased opportunities to take part in decision-making and discussing negative impacts of
surrogate decision-making); Millar, supra note 82, at 292 (describing a guardianship’s impact
on an individual’s self-determination).
84. Eniola Salami, More than Meets the Eye: Relational Autonomy and DecisionMaking by Adults with Developmental Disabilities, 32 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 91, 95–
96 (2015). See also Alternatives to Guardianship, THE ARC OF TEXAS (2016)
https://www.thearcoftexas.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Alternatives_to_Guardianship_
for_Families_2016-06.pdf (discussing learned decision-making through practice and guidance from supporters); Kohn, supra note 83, at 1114–15 (discussing the impact of decreased
opportunities to practice decision-making abilities, evidence of disempowerment through
surrogate decision-making, and proposing that supportive decision-making would result in
greater empowerment).
85. See Salzman, supra note 12, at 193–94.
86. See, e.g., Kuelbs v. Hill, 2010 Ark. App. 793, 797, 379 S.W.3d 716, 721 (noting that
courts are not required to analyze a guardian’s suitability beyond a court’s satisfaction that
the person is qualified based on statutory requirements).
87. Many states require guardians to file reports annually, but jurisdictions vary on their
reporting requirements. See generally Judge David Hardy, Who Is Guarding the Guardians?
A Localized Call for Improved Guardianship Systems and Monitoring, 4 NAELA J. 1, 14–19
(2008) (critiquing the limited oversight that exists nationwide).
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Guardianship Intends to Protect, but Has Substantial Gaps in Its
Protection

If the state removes a person’s right to autonomy, the state has a duty
to protect that person;88 however, most jurisdictions have no training requirement for new guardians.89 This is particularly concerning because
guardianships subject a person to complete dependency on matters ranging
from housing, involuntary placement, community involvement, financial
decisions, medical treatment, and association with others.90 A guardian is
not mandated to promote a ward’s self-reliance or independence.91
Guardians generally must submit annual reports with updates on each
ward’s status and whether continued guardianship services are necessary.92
Many states, including Arkansas, rely on self-reporting, which provides
minimal accountability.93 Without meaningful accountability, the people
assigned the protection of a guardianship become vulnerable to abuse and
exploitation.94 Some jurisdictions have additional requirements such as
training, licensing, additional reporting standards, and enhanced court oversight.95 Despite the purpose of guardianship, large gaps in its protection remain.96
2.

Substantial Limitations on a Person’s Rights Outweigh the Purported Protections Provided by Traditional Guardianships

Guardianship has been criticized for its significant impact on legal
rights.97 To prevent unnecessary restrictions, guardianship orders should be
88. Salzman, supra note 19, at 545–47.
89. Hardy, supra note 87, at 8 (referencing a series of articles in the Los Angeles Times
that spotlighted continued problems with the guardianship system); Bayles, supra note 61.
90. Salzman, supra note 12, at 167.
91. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-322 (Repl. 2012) (outlining the contents of the annual
report to be submitted by all guardians); Salzman, supra note 19, at 545.
92. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 34.
93. See generally id.(noting general annual reporting requirements for guardians in
many jurisdictions); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-322 (Repl. 2012).
94. Id. at 22.
95. Id. at 23.
96. See Hardy, supra note 87, at 7 (critiquing the limited oversight of guardians).
97. See Michael L. Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind”: The
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1159, 1174–76 (2013) (considering the rights described in the
CRDP like the right to be free from discrimination and from institutionalization); Henry G.
Watkins, The Right to Vote of Persons Under Guardianship—Limited or Otherwise, 44 ARIZ.
ATT’Y 34, 34–35 (2007) (discussing legal implications such as disenfranchisement for people
subjected to a guardianship). See generally Salzman, supra note 12, at 183–201 (applying
concepts of segregation and discrimination to the use of guardianship).
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narrowly tailored and used only after rejecting less restrictive alternatives.98
Critics equate a guardianship to “civil death” based on the revocation of
legal rights and many personal choices.99 Guardians’ decisions involve personal issues such as housing, medical treatment, psychiatric services, and
association with others.100 These choices involve questions of autonomy and
self-determination in all areas of a person’s life.101
A guardian’s decision-making process is often unguided and takes on
different forms using a variety of standards, such as “the best interest standard” or considering the ward’s wishes.102 A decision may be based on what
the guardian believes the ward would choose, if the ward was able to make
an informed decision.103 This standard is difficult to apply for someone with
intellectual disabilities because the perceived incapacity is not a recent development, making it difficult to know what the person would choose.104
The guardian and the person’s expressed opinions may create tension
when they differ.105 Guardians for individuals with intellectual disabilities
should not be the equivalent of parents making decisions for their children,
but the legal system treats them as such.106 Even decisions made in the “best
interest” of the person often merely substitutes the opinion of the guardian
for that of the person.107 Increased difficulty arises when applying a general
standard for decision-making for individuals with a perceived incapacitation.108 Standards vary drastically in application and guidance in this area
and may contain conflicting directives.109

98. Jennifer J. Monthie, The Myth of Liberty and Justice for All: Guardianship in New
York State, 80 ALBANY L. REV. 947, 951 (2016-2017).
99. Perlin, supra note 97, at 1166–68.
100. Crane, supra note 60, at 184–85.
101. Burke, supra note 51, at 888–89 (describing the impact of guardianship on a person’s self-determination and explaining the concept of the dignity of risk).
102. Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted Judgment/Best Interest Standard for Guardian Decisions: A Proposal for Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 739,
742–43 (2012) (noting the lack of statutory guidance for guardians). See also Hardy, supra
note 87, at 19–21 (recommending training, guidance, and oversight for guardians).
103. See Sally Hurme & Erica Wood, Third National Guardianship Summit: Standards of
Excellence: Introduction, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1157, 1170 (2012).
104. See Burke, supra note 51, at 879 (discussing the problems specific to making decisions for individuals with developmental disabilities); Hurme & Wood, supra note 103, at
1170.
105. See generally Burke, supra note 51, at 886–88 (applying the principles in Recevik,
supra note 80).
106. Bayles, supra note 61.
107. Frolik, supra note 102, at 741.
108. Hurme & Wood, supra note 103, at 1170.
109. See Frolik & Whitton, supra note 102, at 742–50 (considering the lack of guidance
provided to guardians and the problems with the conflicting guidance that is available).
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General Scope and Implications of Modern Guardianships in the
United States

Guardianships today are usually set up in a limited form, rather than
plenary.110 Guardianship hearings rarely include a jury; a single judge makes
all factual and legal conclusions.111 The court’s decision is often made using
a standard that emphasizes the best interest of the person.112 Even limited
guardianships remove the individual from the decision-making process and
do little to enhance independence of the individual.113 An alternative to
guardianship must be legally recognized to be viable as a form of support
for people with disabilities.114
4.

Arkansas’s Current Statutes on Guardianship for Individuals with
Intellectual Disabilities Lack Meaningful Protection and Do Little
to Promote Independence.

Arkansas does not have separate statutory guidelines for guardianship
concerning individuals with intellectual disabilities.115 Arkansas’s guardianship policies authorize the grant of power to the extent necessary based on
the alleged incapacitated person’s abilities and includes language encouraging the development of self-reliance and independence.116 These provisions
are a good start but, practically speaking, lack meaningful guidance and fall
short of empowerment.117 Viewing guardianship as a necessary protection
leads to a loss of liberty for individuals subjected to it.118 The National
110. Frolik, supra note 31, at 744–46.
111. Id. at 735.
112. Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Priority and Preference in Appointment of Conservator or Guardian for an Incompetent, 65 A.L.R. 3d 991, § 3 (1975, updated 2018).
113. Crane, supra note 60, at 191. See also Salzman, supra note 72, at 294–96 (considering the use of limited guardianships and overly board guardianship orders).
114. See Burke, supra note 51, at 877–80; Crane, supra note 60, 188–89.
115. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-210 (Supp. 2017) (describing for whom a guardianship
may be appointed and under what circumstances); NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note
13, at 171 (listing states with guardianship statutes for individuals with intellectual disabilities).
116. According to Arkansas’s guardianship statute:
Guardianship for an incapacitated person shall be: (1) Used only as is necessary
to promote and protect the well-being of the person and his or her property; (2)
Designed to encourage the development of maximum self-reliance and independence of the person; (3) Ordered only to the extent necessitated by the person’s actual mental, physical, and adoptive limitations.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-105 (Repl. 2012).
117. See generally Salzman, supra note 12, at 174–78 (criticizing the minimal impact of
statutory reforms).
118. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 21. See also Kohn, supra note 83,
at 1138–39 (considering psychological impact of guardianships).
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Council on Disability (NCD) recommends guidelines on the appointment of
a guardian to emphasize alternatives.119 The guidelines proposed by the
NCD include “provision[s] for preventing unnecessary guardianships,”
which, with the help of other reforms, would greatly impact the guardianship system.120
Though representation is not denied, an attorney ad litem is specifically
noted as unnecessary for guardianship proceedings. 121 An attorney ad litem
would undoubtedly benefit an alleged incapacitated person by providing an
impartial perspective, particularly when guardianship determinations are left
to a court to exercise discretion in the person’s best interest.122 Although a
determination of incompetency must be established by clear and convincing
evidence, courts have broad authority in the admission of evidence.123 Arkansas requires that guardianship be implemented only if less restrictive
alternatives are not feasible, but does not give guidance for making such a
determination.124 Arkansas statutes include empowering language, but could
do more to ensure that the individuals affected are actually empowered.
III. A SHIFT TOWARD UNIVERSAL CAPACITY REJECTS COMMON
GUARDIANSHIPS AND ITS RESTRICTIONS
Problems inherent to guardianship, such as the revocation of legal and
fundamental rights, sparked international disapproval and demands for
meaningful reform.125 Over the years, innovative approaches to empowerment for people with intellectual disabilities provided renewed interest in

119. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 21. See also Crane, supra note 60,
at 203–07 (providing examples of contradicting actions leading to legal uncertainty).
120. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 21.
121. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-207(c)(3) (Repl. 2012).
122. See generally Bogan v. Ark. First Nat’l Bank, 249 Ark. 840, 844, 462 S.W.2d 203,
204 (1971) (discussing the best interest standard); McCartney v. Merchants & Planters Bank,
227 Ark. 80, 82, 296 S.W.2d 407, 408 (1956) (appointing a bank as guardian based on the
best interest of the person); Martin v. Decker, 96 Ark. App. 45, 52–53, 237 S.W.3d 502, 507
(2006) (reaffirming the best interest of the person standard).
123. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-211 (Repl. 2012) (defining the evidence required
for determinations of incapacity and allowing the court discretion in requiring the presence of
the alleged incapacitated person); id. § 28-65-213 (outlining some possible evaluations to
use). See generally Sanders v. Omohundro, 204 Ark. 1040, 166 S.W.2d 657 (1942) (recognizing a presumption of insanity based on present institutionalization of the alleged incapacitated person). But see Autry v. Beckham 2014 Ark. App. 692, 450 S.W. 3d 247 (criticizing
the trial court for failing to acquire professional evaluations before the guardianship hearing).
124. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-101(6) (Supp. 2017) (defining “least restrictive alternative”); id. § 28-65-213(c)(1) (requiring the court to determine the “feasibility of less restrictive alternatives to guardianship to meet the needs of the respondent.”).
125. Salzman, supra note 12, at 166–74.
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current protections.126 Approaches have been adapted to fit different models
and systems in an international push toward independence.127 These reformation efforts have been motivated by fundamental principles of empowerment and autonomy.128
A.

Popular Approaches to Supplement or Replace Traditional Guardianship for Individuals with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities

Reformation momentum accelerated with society’s changing views on
civil rights for people with intellectual disabilities.129 Society’s increasing
recognition of certain rights for people with disabilities demands a critical
examination of current policies for guardianship.130 These changing views
inspired new alternatives to guardianships that promote independence.131
Some alternatives can promote self-determination while retaining safeguards
to prevent exploitation.132 Alternatives exist in familiar, legally recognized
methods, like powers of attorney and special needs trusts, but are also available in less common forms, like case management and support networks.133
Unfortunately, many of these legally recognized alternatives are not viable
options for a person with disabilities who may be deemed incapable of appointing a representative.134
Some alternative methods, like person-centered planning and supported
decision-making, are adapted and applied in different forms.135 Personcentered planning, a concept used by many interdisciplinary teams serving
people with disabilities, emphasizes empowerment by placing the person
126. See Kristin Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity,
Guardianship, and Beyond, 44 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 93, 128 (2012) (discussing
society’s changing views of civil rights for people with intellectual disabilities).
127. See generally A. Frank Johns, Person-Centered Guardianship and Supported Decision Making: An Assessment of Progress Made in Three Countries, 9 J. INT’L AGING L. &
POL’Y 1 (2016) (discussing the application of these models in Sweden, Canada, and Australia).
128. Id. at 1–3.
129. See Crane, supra note 60, at 178; Julia R. Nack et al., Creating and Sustaining Interdisciplinary Guardianship, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1667, 1667 (2012).
130. Ryan Kelley, Note, Toward an Unconditional Right to Vote for Persons with Mental
Disabilities: Reconciling State Law with Constitutional Guarantees, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 359, 374–75 (2010).
131. Burke, supra note 51, at 880–85.
132. Id. at 883–89.
133. Millar, supra note 82, at 297–301.
134. See Crane, supra note 60, at 203–04 (discussing potential uncertainty in alternatives
to guardianships for individuals with intellectual disabilities).
135. See Johns, supra note 127, at 1547 (discussing the adaptability and variety of approaches using person-centered planning as its descriptor); Kohn, supra note 83, at 1121
(noting that supported decision-making has been used in many applications using the same
principles and characterization).
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served at the center of all decisions.136 This approach asks what is “important to” the person served and what is “important for” that person.137 It
examines what is “working” versus what is “not working.”138 By asking
these questions, support teams ensure the person is involved in the planning
process and attempts to circumvent the tendency of advocates to gravitate
toward substitute decision-making.139 Ideally, these decisions would be
made with the person, rather than for the person.140
Supported decision-making, another alternative to guardianship, uses
an information-sharing network that leaves the ultimate decision to the person supported.141 In this system, the person served is the decision-maker.142
Supporters provide neutral, factual information so the person served can
make an informed decision.143 Adaptations of the supported decision-making
model take many forms.144 It imitates familiar support systems that already
exist in modern societies.145 People, with and without disabilities, normally
seek guidance from trusted family or friends to help them make decisions
about many aspects of life.146
These models are growing in popularity and are often considered practical alternatives or enhancements to guardianships.147 Serious reformation
of the guardianship system is daunting,148 but advocates propose incorporating these concepts into existing guardianship laws.149 Some critics are skeptical about alternatives that remove court oversight and raise questions about
136. Johns, supra note 127, at 1547–49.
137. Id. at 1550.
138. Id.
139. See generally id. at 1549–50 (explaining the basis for person-centered planning and
the importance of advocate awareness).
140. See id. at 1549 (stating the goal for person-centered planning is to use and
acknowledge these perspectives to provide assistance).
141. See Nandini Devi, Supported Decision-Making and Personal Autonomy for Persons
with Intellectual Disabilities: Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 792, 799 (2013); Jasmine E. Harris, The Role of Support
in Sexual Decision-Making for People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 77
OHIO ST. L. J. 84, 84 (2016).
142. Kohn, supra note 83, at 1121.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Harris, supra note 141, at 84.
146. Id.
147. Crane, supra note 60, at 179.
148. See Swann, supra note 11, at 318 (discussing the magnitude of constitutional reform).
149. See generally Donna S. Harkness, Supported Decision Making: The Missing Piece in
the Puzzle of Planning for Clients with Diminished Capacity, 54 TENN. B.J. 19, 22–23 (2018)
(discussing problems with guardianship alternatives and proposing legal recognition for
supported decision-making in Tennessee); Johns, supra note 127, at 1555–64 (proposing the
incorporation of a person-centered planning into existing guardianship policies).
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the exposure to exploitation.150 Opponents are also hesitant because of the
limited research on the efficacy of support-based models.151 These critiques
are addressed in greater detail in Part IV along with the application of these
approaches in the United States.152
B.

International Reforms That Focus on Empowerment and Autonomy

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), a
treaty created by representatives from nations around the world, advocates
for universal recognition of legal capacity.153 The CRPD includes feedback
to participating nations to evaluate reformations and make recommendations.154 The CRPD emphasizes the importance of decision-making and
promotes the use of supports based on individual abilities.155 The treaty favors a supported decision-making approach; traditional substitute decisionmaking may be entirely contradictory to its principle mission.156
Nations throughout the world have adopted different practices to promote independence.157 A brief discussion of policies in other countries is
included to provide context for the reforms in the United States.158 Extreme
propositions advocate for the abolition of guardianship for people with intellectual disabilities.159 More conservative recommendations incorporate supported-decision or person-centered planning approaches into existing policies for individuals with intellectual disabilities.160
Many countries have safeguards from the implications of traditional
guardianships.161 New Zealand adopted a heightened threshold to rebut the

150. Hugo Dwyer & VOR’s Committee on Guardianship Rights, Issues to Consider
Regarding Guardianship and Supported Decision-Making, EP MAG., Dec. 2016, at 34–35,
http://www.eparent.com/money-uncategorized/issues-consider-regarding-guardianshipsupported-decision-making/.
151. Crane, supra note 60, at 191–93. See generally Kohn, supra note 83, at 1128–42
(discussing evidence for supported decision-making models).
152. See discussion infra Part IV.
153. See generally Devi, supra note 141, at 794–97 (discussing the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities).
154. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 60–61.
155. Devi, supra note 141, at 799.
156. Id. at 793. See also G.A. Res. 61/106 Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (Jan. 24, 2007) (emphasizing equal rights for all persons).
157. See generally Dinerstein, supra note 16, 448–52 (discussing initiatives to promote
autonomy occurring in different countries).
158. Id. (comparing guardianship policies of the United States and other nations).
159. Kohn, supra note 83, at 1124 (considering the concept of universal capacity).
160. Id. at 1124–26.
161. See generally Dinerstein, supra note 16, at 448–52 (discussing the progressive trends
in various countries worldwide).
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presumption of competency.162 Sweden banned findings of incapacity based
on intellectual disabilities and requires its guardians to work toward becoming unnecessary.163
The Republic of Korea acknowledges both supported and substituted
forms of decision-making.164 The United Kingdom provides supported decision-making as a public service.165 Canada recognizes different forms of
representative-based supports, permitting a third party to make decisions for
the principal.166 These representatives must make reasonable efforts to act
consistent with the wishes of the principal167 and some forms require the
principal’s consent.168 Australia combats reliance on the best interests approach with a guide called the “Capacity Toolkit.”169 This guide emphasizes
the presumption of capacity and points out that abilities are situationally
specific.170
The underlying concepts of these approaches are like the principles in
supported decision-making models.171 Success in these programs relies on a
well-trained support network, the availability of structured supports, and
universal recognition of the right to autonomy.172 Proposed changes have
been criticized for their broad but unsupported claims of success.173 Proponents point to the continued use and growing popularity of alternative approaches as evidence that these systems are not only viable but increasingly
preferred.174
C.

The Reformation Movement in the United States

The United States has begun adopting reforms that focus on empowerment.175 Supported decision-making is one alternative to guardianship that is
becoming more prevalent.176 National attention from key cases has attracted
public attention and given momentum to the guardian reformation move162. Id. at 449–50.
163. Id. at 448–59.
164. Id. at 450–51.
165. Id. Crane, supra note 60, at 198.
166. Crane, supra note 60, at 195; Dinerstein, supra note 16, at 448–59.
167. Kohn, supra note 83, at 1121.
168. Crane, supra note 60, at 198.
169. Johns, supra note 127, at 20–21.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 11 (discussing the supported decision-making principles used in Canada).
172. See id. at 14–16 (considering skepticism of supported decision-making and its success in Canada to determine necessary aspects of a supported decision-making system).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 119–20 (discussing alternatives to guardianship that have attracted attention in the United States).
176. Id. at 135–37.
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ment.177 Even private organizations, such as the American Bar Association,
have embraced supported decision-making as an alternative to guardianship.178
1.

United States Courts Have Begun to Acknowledge the Viability of
Guardianship Alternatives

Some U.S. courts have acknowledged the viability of supported decision-making systems in place of traditional guardianships.179 One young
woman’s case drew national attention when she successfully defended her
family’s attempt to establish guardianship.180 Though she had previously
lived independently, she required additional help while recovering from a
bicycle accident.181 She argued that her needs were temporary and that she
had a support network that met her needs.182 The court, in its opinion,
acknowledged the supported decision-making model as an appropriate, less
restrictive means of protection and support.183
Another court terminated a woman’s guardianship after she developed
a network based on a supported decision-making model.184 The court found
that a supported decision-making network was sufficient to meet her needs
and warranted the termination of the existing guardianship.185 These cases,
and others like them, show a national shift toward acknowledging alternative forms of support for individuals with intellectual disabilities in lieu of
guardianship.186
177. Id. at 63–64.
178. Dinerstein, supra note 16, at 456–57.
179. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 63–64.
180. Order at 3, Ross v. Hatch, No. CWF120000426P-03 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 2013); The
Justice for Jenny Trial, THE JENNY HATCH JUST. PROJECT, http://jennyhatchjusticeproject.org/
trial (last visited Mar. 10, 2019).
181. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 63–64.
182. Dinerstein, supra note 16, at 454.
183. Order at 5, Ross v. Hatch, No. CWF120000426P-03 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 2013);
THE JENNY HATCH JUST. PROJECT, supra note 180. See also NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,
supra note 13, at 63–64; Dinerstein, supra note 16, at 454 (considering examples of courts
acknowledging guardianship alternatives).
184. In re Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854–856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012).
185. Id. See also Dinerstein, supra note 16, at 454 (discussing the court’s reasoning and
acceptance of an alternative to guardianship).
186. See, e.g., Order, Ross v. Hatch, No. CWF120000426P-03 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2,
2013); In re Peery, 727 A.2d 539, 540 (Pa. 1999) (supporting a trial court’s finding that there
was not a need for guardianship); In re Michelle M., 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2719, at *14
(Kings Cty. Sur. Ct. ) (rejecting the alleged need for plenary guardianship); NAT’L COUNCIL
ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 63–64 (noting the trend away from guardianships); Freedom
for Ryan King, THE JENNY HATCH JUST. PROJECT (Dec. 12, 2016),
http://jennyhatchjusticeproject.org/impact-stories-ryan-king-2 (terminating a guardianship in
lieu of a support network); Cory, Pilot Project Participant, SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING,
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State Reforms to Guardianship and Advocacy for Individuals with
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities

Many states require using the least restrictive means of support necessary when addressing the needs of an alleged incapacitated person.187 Several states have guardianship policies specifically designed for individuals
with intellectual disabilities.188 Few states have enacted statutory schemes
that legally recognize supported decision-making models for individuals
with disabilities.189 This section reviews policies from two states190 that use
different approaches to guardianship and advocacy for individuals with intellectual disabilities.191
a.

Texas legally recognizes supported decision-making agreements for individuals with intellectual disabilities

Texas was the first state to legally recognize supported decisionmaking agreements.192 Texas adopted this model for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities who live in the community. 193 Texas,
through collaborations with advocacy groups like The Arc,194 promotes the
use of alternatives and strongly encourages consideration of all options
based on the necessary level of support.195 Texas revised statutory provi-

http://supporteddecisions.org/cory/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2019) (denying a guardianship based
on an existing support network).
187. Salzman, supra note 12, at 171–72.
188. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 171 (listing Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, and South
Dakota as states having guardianship statutes with specific provisions for people with developmental disabilities).
189. Harkness, supra note 149, at 22 (listing Texas, Delaware, and Washington, D.C. as
states that legally recognize supported decision-making as an alternative to guardianship).
190. Texas and Michigan were chosen for closer evaluation based on each state’s practical and unique reforms.
191. See Harkness, supra note 151, at 22–23 (listing states that legally recognize supported decision-making); NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 135-37 (discussing
the acknowledgement of Supported Decision-Making by various courts).
192. Alternatives
to
Guardianship,
THE
ARC
OF
TEXAS
(2016),
https://www.thearcoftexas.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Alternatives_to_Guardianship_
for_Families_2016-06.pdf.
193. Dinerstein, supra note 16, at 455.
194. The Arc of Texas is a Texas-based group that advocates for social and legislative
change for people with developmental disabilities. Mission, History, and Achievement, THE
ARC OF TEXAS (Dec. 11, 2018, 6:50 PM), https://www.thearcoftexas.org/who-we-are/.
195. See THE ARC OF TEXAS, supra note 192 (listing alternatives such as supported decision-making, powers of attorney, representative payees, joint bank accounts, special trusts,
money management programs, Medicaid services, and advanced medical directives).
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sions, like the Texas Bill of Rights for Persons Under Guardianship, to create greater protections from exploitation and promote empowerment.196
Texas law has safety measures to prevent unnecessary guardianships
and unacceptable conduct by its guardians.197 Notably, Texas requires courts
to make reasonable efforts to consider the preference of the respondent in
guardianship proceedings.198 All guardians are required to complete statesponsored training, which includes subjects like responsibilities of guardians, alternative services available, and the Bill of Rights for Persons Under
Guardianship.199
b.

Michigan’s inclusive policies empower people with a range
of abilities and protect individual rights throughout guardianship proceedings

Michigan implemented several creative provisions to empower individuals with a range of capabilities.200 Michigan statutes prevent assumptions about the “least restrictive” means by providing additional requirements that address due process concerns.201 For example, a court must answer questions related to capacity and each response must be supported by
clear and convincing evidence.202 A guardian’s powers are substantially limited.203 For instance, no guardian has the power to consent to placement in
an institution without a court order.204
196. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1151.351 (West 2019) (effective June 19, 2015 to August
31, 2019).
197. See THE ARC OF TEXAS, supra note 192 (discussing some of the rights afforded to
wards and requirements of guardians).
198. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1104.002 (West 2019) (preference of incapacitated person).
199. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1104.003 (West 2019) (training required); THE ARC OF
TEXAS, supra note 193 (citing TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1151.351 (2017)).
200. Deborah A. Mattison, Guardianship for Persons with Developmental Disabilities, 66
MICH. B. J. 18, 21 (1987).
201. Id. at 18.
202. See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 330.1617 (LexisNexis 2018) (outlining guardianship proceedings); id. § 330.1618 (requiring evaluations of capacity and describing partial
and plenary guardians).
203. See generally id. § 330.1620 (outlining contents of guardianship order, rights retained, and finding of legal incompetence or incapacity); id. § 330.1623 (requirements for
placement in a facility); id. § 330.1631 (detailing plenary and partial guardians, duties, and
reports to court); id. § 330.1634 (requiring the court to inform a ward of the right to request a
dismissal or modification of the guardianship order); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 330.1637
(LexisNexis 2018) (detailing the petition for discharge or modification order); Mattison,
supra note 201, at 19–20 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1615) (affording legal counsel for
respondent).
204. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 330.1623 (LexisNexis 2018) (outlining requirements for
placement in a facility, inquiry into appropriateness, and residential programs). See generally
Richard C. Boldt, The “Voluntary” Inpatient Treatment of Adults Under Guardianship, 60
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Michigan affords an alleged incapacitated person the right to independent evaluations and legal representation with financial assistance available
for both.205 Michigan’s partial guardianships do not create legal implications
of incapacity,206 must specify all granted authorities,207 and expire within
five years.208 All guardianship orders, both plenary and partial, must include
a statement of duration.209 Michigan’s guardians must submit annual reports
that include a summary of services provided to the individual, guardian’s
visits with the ward, and all financial transactions.210
When appointing a guardian, Michigan courts consider the respondent’s preference for the person appointed.211 When a guardian is appointed,
the court must attempt to inform the individual of the right to request termination or modification of the guardianship.212 An individual with developmental disabilities may make these requests in any form, including oral requests or informal letters.213 Requests for review or termination of a guardianship are considered using the same standards and rights afforded in an
initial appointment.214
3.

Critics Question the Claims of Success and Potential for Abuse
with Alternatives to Guardianship

Although the United States has begun acknowledging alternatives,
guardianships remain the primary form of court-appointed and legally recognizable advocacy for individuals with intellectual disabilities.215 Critics of
guardianship alternatives are skeptical about the grand, unproven claims of
VILL. L. REV. 1, 23 (2015) (critiquing voluntary admissions of people under a guardianship to
institutions).
205. See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 330.1617 (LexisNexis 2018) (outlining guardianship proceedings); Mattison, supra note 201, at 19–20 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1615)
(affording legal counsel for respondents).
206. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 330.1620 (LexisNexis 2018) (outlining the contents of a
partial guardianship order, rights retained, and findings of legal incompetence or incapacity).
207. Id.
208. Id. § 330.1626 (defining the term of a guardianship).
209. Id.
210. Id. § 330.1631 (defining plenary and partial guardians, duties, reports to court, and
the review of reports).
211. Id. § 330.1628 (outlining qualifications for a guardian).
212. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 330.1634 (LexisNexis 2018) (requiring courts to attempt
to inform a ward of right to request a guardian’s dismissal or modification of a guardianship
order).
213. Mattison, supra note 201, at 20 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1637) (outlining the
petition for discharge or modification order and acceptable forms of communication to court).
214. Id.
215. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 66 (noting the rate of filing for
guardianship had a negligible decrease, which indicates either no change or even growth in
the use of guardianships).
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success.216 Some opponents warn that alternatives to guardianship remove
the protection of court oversight and use general concepts, which disregard
individual vulnerabilities.217 Opposition typically focuses on the efficacy of
these systems, the limited data supporting alternative approaches, and concerns about the risk of abuse without the protection provided by guardianships.218
Alternative approaches to advocacy boast success primarily using anecdotal evidence.219 Further research capturing data about abstract concepts
like independence, self-reliance, and self-determination is undoubtedly
needed.220 Subjective feelings are difficult to quantify and even more difficult to standardize.221
Some criticize the universal assumption of capacity necessary to the
supported decision-making model.222 If all persons can make decisions using
a support network, then those with the most severe handicaps will be expected to make a decision relying on the guidance of others.223 If decisions
are guided by others, supported decision-making has failed.224
In response, proponents of supported decision-making emphasize the
adaptability of the system to ensure people are empowered to the extent of
their abilities, but not beyond them.225 There is the potential for inaccurate or
substitute decision-making, which requires further research to determine
how to prevent such unintended outcomes.226 Approaches incorporating per216. See generally Dwyer, supra note 150, at 34–35 (expressing concerns about removing
protections provided with a guardianship); Kohn, supra note 83, at 1128–32 (noting the limited research available for supported decision-making); Ian M. Evans, Trying to Make Apple
Pie an Independent Variable: Comment on “How Science Can Evaluate and Enhance Person-Centered Planning”, 27 RES. AND PRAC. FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE DISABILITIES 265,
265–67 (2002) (reviewing criticism of person-centered planning).
217. Dwyer, supra note 150, at 34–35.
218. Kohn, supra note 83, at 1128–32 (discussing attacks on supported decision-making
models and recommendations for more research). See also Dwyer, supra note 150, at 34–35
(criticizing alternatives claiming an increased exposure to exploitation or abuse).
219. See generally NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 139–60 (considering
the outcomes of various models based on the perspective of assisted persons, supporters, and
professionals).
220. See generally Evans, supra note 216, at 265–67 (discussing recent research on person-centered planning and the importance of qualitative factors).
221. Id.
222. Dwyer, supra note 150, at 35.
223. Id.
224. Id. See also Devi, supra note 141, at 796 (describing the use of the “best interest”
standard in supported decision-making for people with intellectual disabilities).
225. Devi, supra note 141, at 796 (discussing categories for the level of support needed
based on a minimum threshold). See also NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at
133–34 (considering supported decision-making for people with different abilities).
226. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 132–33 (considering areas in need
of further research for supported decision-based models).
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son-centered planning attempt to avoid incidental surrogate decisions by
focusing on the person served.227 Both approaches have been modified in
various forms to fit the specific needs of the person and overall system. 228
Ultimately, any approach must be adapted to suit individual needs.229
Supporters of guardianship contend that, without court oversight and
accountability, vulnerable people will be put at an increased risk of abuse
and exploitation.230 Research is limited on alternative forms of support in all
areas.231 Similarly, though guardianships intend to protect the vulnerable
from exploitation and abuse,232 there is limited research to support the success of this claim.233 Regardless of the form of advocacy or support, greater
oversight and accountability are necessary to prevent abuse to the people it
means to protect.234
IV. ARKANSAS SHOULD ADOPT NEW POLICIES TO REFLECT SOCIETAL
CHANGES IN ADVOCACY AND PROTECT INDIVIDUALS WITH INTELLECTUAL
AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES FROM UNNECESSARY OR OVERLY
BROAD GUARDIANSHIPS
Although international reform is inspiring, it is likely incompatible
with Arkansas’s existing guardianship systems, particularly when many of
the provisions are more progressive than reforms in the United States.235 As
stated in Part III, a few states made meaningful efforts to reform guardianship policies to empower individuals with intellectual disabilities;236 Arkan-

227. Johns, supra note 135, at 1549–50.
228. See id. at 1547 (noting the adaptability of person-centered planning approaches);
Kohn, supra note 83, at 1121 (discussing various applications of supported decision-making
models).
229. See generally Devi, supra note 141, at 796 (categorizing the level of support provided based on individual need and ability).
230. Dwyer, supra note 150, at 35.
231. Kohn, supra note 83, at 1128–32 (discussing common attacks on supported decision-making models, a brief review of research on its use, and recommendations for more
research).
232. Dwyer, supra note 150, at 35.
233. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 101–02 (discussing the limited
availability of information about guardianships); Hardy, supra note 87, at 4 (discussing the
use of guardianships and its potential for abuse); id. at 9–10 (describing the limited data
available).
234. Hardy, supra note 87, at 12–15 (reviewing the policy recommendations for various
systems to provide greater protections from abuse and exploitation).
235. See generally Dinerstein, supra note 16, at 445–57 (considering the reforms in various countries, the stance of the CRPD, and the reforms that have taken place in the United
States).
236. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 55–60 (reviewing guardianship
reforms in the United States). See discussion supra Part III.
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sas has not been one of them.237 Arkansas laws are general and provide little
protection for an alleged incapacitated person.238 When reforming guardianship policies, Arkansas should consider policies in other states that emphasize autonomy while ensuring individual protection.
A.

Arkansas Should Bolster Due Process Protections for Alleged Incapacitated Persons

Additional due process protections should be implemented to prevent
unnecessary or overbearing guardianships. Generally, restrictions on individual liberties must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.239 Current
statutes should be revised to ensure decisions on capacity are held to this
standard by removing exceptions to certain protections and including obstacles to prevent arbitrary determinations of incapacity.
Arkansas requires that a person be incapacitated, that the guardianship
sought is for the protection of the incapacitated person, and that the petitioner is qualified.240 Arkansas should adopt statutory guidelines that necessitate
and identify less restrictive alternatives based on specific findings of fact.241
Findings should identify the person’s particular areas of need. When a need
is identified, the court should first consider what support would adequately
237. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-106 (Supp. 2017) (noting a change in the wording used to describe a ward); id. § 28-65-203 (noting amendments to change specific wording
and one amendment about state officials acting as a guardian). See discussion supra Part II.
238. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-211 (Repl. 2012) (describing evidence required
for the determination of incapacity without specificity to the nature or extent of the incapacity
and providing the court discretion in requiring the presence of the alleged incapacitated person); id. § 28-65-210 (requiring the court to determine the person is “a minor or otherwise
incapacitated,” “a guardianship is desirable to protect the interests of the incapacitated person” and “the person to be appointed” meets the minimum qualifications); id. § 28-65-213
(discussing appointment of a guardian when “it is found that the respondent is substantially
without capacity to care for himself or herself or his or her estate”); id. § 28-65-402 (allowing
consideration of the restoration of capacity when “any person alleges in writing, verified by
oath,” that the person subjected to a guardianship is no longer incapacitated).
239. See Monthie, supra note 98, at 967 (discussing the liberty interests at stake in guardianship proceedings and a standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence). Compare
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-213(b) (Repl. 2012) (stating the burden of proof must be met by
clear and convincing evidence), with id. § 28-65-210 (requiring the court to be satisfied that
the appointment of a guardianship is “desirable to protect the interests of the incapacitated
person.”).
240. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-210 (Repl. 2012).
241. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 330.1618 (LexisNexis 2018) (prompting the
court to answer questions related to capacity and actions resulting from such answers), and
id. § 330.1617 (describing guardianship proceedings, right to present evidence, and independent evaluation), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-210 (Repl. 2012), and Kelley v. Davis,
216 Ark. 828, 830, 227 S.W.2d 637, 639 (1950) (defining capacity by an ability to take part
in the activities presented).
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serve the individual.242 If the person needs financial management assistance,
for example, the court should identify the need and consider the least intrusive form of assistance.243 Could a financial manager or a special needs trust
satisfy the need?244 Does the person need extensive support that can only be
met by a court-appointed limited guardian of the estate? If a guardian is
needed, the court should explicitly list in clear language the extent of the
guardian’s authority.
Currently, Arkansas allows the respondent a right to counsel.245 The
right to independent representation should be expanded to allow courts to
appoint legal counsel if the alleged incapacitated person is unable to financially afford counsel.246 Arkansas does not afford additional protections that
may be necessary to defend against an alleged incapacitation such as independent evaluations.247 “Least restrictive means” should be better defined;
the court should be required to answer specific questions of fact and a decision should be based on those answers.248
Capacity decisions rely on evaluations and testimonial evidence regarding intelligence and ability. Standardized testing examines both intellectual
capabilities as well as adaptive behaviors.249 Additional evidence of ability
should be encouraged based on various theories of capacity. Some approaches determine cognitive ability through questions of understanding and
resilience.250 Another model uses categories of decision-making abilities
separated by levels of capability with consideration of ability to express
intentions and understand consequences of decisions made.251 Evaluative
242. See generally Devi, supra note 141, at 796 (considering varying levels of support
needed based on a minimum threshold); NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at
133–34 (applying supported decision-making for people with different abilities).
243. See generally NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 122–26 (noting
concerns about financial management and listing supportive alternatives to guardianship).
244. Id.
245. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-213(a)(1) (Repl. 2012).
246. See generally Mattison, supra note 200, at 20 (discussing MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV.
§ 330.1615; id. § 330.1617 which require courts to appoint representation and permit substitute representation upon request by an alleged incapacitated person).
247. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-212 (Repl. 2012) (noting evaluations that may be
considered by the court), with MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 330.1612 (LexisNexis 2018) (allowing financial aid for necessary independent assessments in proceedings about capacity in
Michigan courts).
248. See generally NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 121–22 (proposing
factors to consider when evaluating the need for guardianship or an alternative).
249. Definition of Intellectual Disability, AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITIES,
https://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition (last visited Oct. 5, 2019).
250. Harris, supra note 141, at 95.
251. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 34–36 (describing how capacity is
determined by courts); id. at 79–82 (analyzing the use of expert testimony and factors used in
determinations of incapacity). See also Harris, supra note 141, at 95 (describing the Cognitive Plus Three Step Functional Test as developed by Boni Saenz).
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testing for people with developmental disabilities can be enhanced by asking
questions using different wording and situations over a period of time.252
Regardless of the standards used, the court should make specific findings of fact based on individual abilities before concluding that guardianship
is necessary. The standard would ideally make guardianship presumably
unnecessary and rebutted only through clear and convincing evidence describing the person’s available community services, existing support system,
strengths and challenges, nature of each need, and potential legal replacements in lieu of guardianship.253
B.

Arkansas Should Impose Greater Limitations on Guardians’ Powers

Reformation efforts have, thus far, made minimal impact on the overall
system.254 For example, limited guardianships have done little to actually
restrict a guardian’s powers or to empower the person subjected to it.255 One
particularly troublesome hurdle is overcoming, or at least modifying, the
best interest of the person standard, which is merely substitute decisionmaking and is inconsistent with principles of empowerment.256 The best
interest standard is routinely used by guardians and courts.257 Statutory provisions that require a court to answer questions and attempt to ascertain the
alleged incapacitated person’s preferences may provide greater protection
than the best interest standard alone.258
Using a person-centered planning approach, for example, puts the person served in a position of empowerment, rather than removed from the
decision altogether.259 Rather than focusing on the best interest of the alleged incapacitated person, the court should consider the person in the con252. Harris, supra note 141, at 101.
253. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 121–22.
254. See id. at 55–60 (briefly reviewing successes and failures of guardianship reform
efforts nationally); see discussion supra Part II (discussing historical developments of guardianship in the United States and in Arkansas).
255. Salzman, supra note 12, at 174–76. See also NCI Charts (2015-16): Guardianship,
NAT’L
CORE
INDICATORS,
https://www.nationalcoreindicators.org/charts/?i=137&st
=undefined (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (examining survey results finding only 18% of respondents from Arkansas had limited guardianships, while 44% had plenary guardianships).
256. See Devi, supra note 141, at 803 (considering potential the best interest standard and
describing it as a form of substitute decision-making).
257. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 36 (discussing standards used
by courts when determining the necessity of guardianship); Frolik, supra note 102, at 741–44
(2012) (noting the lack of guidance for guardians on how to make decisions on behalf of a
ward).
258. See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 330.1617 (LexisNexis 2018) (discussing guardianship proceedings, right to present evidence and confront witness, and independent evaluations).
259. Johns, supra note 127, at 1547–48.
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text of his or her environment.260 Person-centered planning is a natural
standard that could be incorporated into the structure of guardianship because both systems aim to support independence and preserve individual
rights.261
Though Arkansas law prohibits a guardian from consenting to certain
medical procedures,262 guardians should also be prohibited from taking other
actions that are not specifically authorized by the court. The guardian’s authority should be limited, and, as a result, the individual’s rights enhanced.
Guardianship orders should expressly state powers granted to a guardian to
ensure all unmentioned rights are retained by the ward.263 The current statutory language does not create clearly defined parameters for guardians or for
courts when appointing guardians.264 Guardianship orders should be narrowly tailored; authority granted therein should be based on actual and individual needs.265 Limited guardianships should actually be limited.
C.

Arkansas Should Require Guardians to Complete Mandatory Training
Prior to Appointment

When guardianship is necessary, oversight of the guardianship and
mandatory training for guardians should be used to protect the affected person.266 Without training, guardians have little guidance when fulfilling their
role and even well-intentioned guardians can make decisions contradictory
to their wards’ wishes.267 Arkansas should require training to ensure guardians have adequate information defining their roles, duties, and responsibilities.268 To hold guardians accountable, the state should provide guidance for
260. See id. at 1549–50 (outlining the person-centered planning approach and including
an examination of the current support system).
261. Id. at 1547–48.
262. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302 (Repl. 2012) (listing decisions requiring
court approval), and id. § 28-65-303 (outlining care, treatment, and confinement of a ward),
with MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 330.1623 (LexisNexis 2018) (prohibiting placement of the
individual in a long-term care facility without the court’s approval), and id. § 330.1620 (defining rights retained by a ward with a partial guardianship).
263. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-214 (Repl. 2012) (outlining guardianship orders).
264. Id. § 28-65-301 (listing duties of a guardian).
265. Compare id. § 28-65-214 (required contents of guardianship orders), with MICH.
COMP. LAWS SERV. § 330.1620 (LexisNexis 2018) (outlining contents of a guardianship order), and id. § 330.1631 (requiring the consideration of less restrictive options).
266. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-655, GUARDIANSHIPS:
COLLABORATION NEEDED TO PROTECT INCAPACITATED ELDERLY PEOPLE, 1-3, 30–32 (2004),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04655.pdf.
267. Frolik, supra note 102, at 739, 742–43. See also Devi, supra note 141, at 803 (discussing the best interest standard and its resemblance to substitute decision-making).
268. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1104.003 (West 2017) (mandating training for guardians
about their responsibilities, less-restrictive alternatives, and services available).
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their decisions, participation, and impact on the lives of their wards. Annual
reports should also include a summary of the previous year’s services provided to the individual, visits and activities on the ward’s behalf, and all
financial transactions.269
At the initial guardianship appointment, the court should make reasonable efforts to inform the person affected. Arkansas should revise the existing statute for the Rights of Incapacitated Persons to include information
about how to request a change or dismissal of a guardian.270 A request for a
modification or termination of a guardianship should be accepted in any
form to accommodate for a range of abilities.271 All requests for modification or termination should be followed by a hearing that adheres to all standards required in the initial proceeding.272
D.

Arkansas Should Promote Alternatives to Guardianship and Make Alternatives Practicable for Persons with Intellectual Disabilities

To facilitate a shift away from guardianships, alternative forms of support must be accessible and legally recognized.273 Many states require courts
to consider less restrictive alternatives.274 Detailed statutory guidelines for
areas of concern would ensure consistent application of these protections.
Reformation cannot be successful without changes to services available and

269. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-322 (Repl. 2012) (reports include current conditions, present living arrangements, need for continued guardianship services, and account of
estate), with MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 330.1631 (LexisNexis 2018) (reports include services provided to the ward, visits with the ward, actions done on behalf of the ward, and
financial activity).
270. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-106 (Repl. 2012) (Rights of incapacitated persons), with MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 330.1628 (LexisNexis 2018) (defining the rights of a
ward in Michigan), and TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1151.351 (West 2017) (Bill of Rights for
Wards).
271. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-402 (Repl. 2012) (stating that restoration of
capacity will be considered when “any person alleges in writing, verified by oath,” that the
person subjected to a guardianship is no longer incapacitated), with Mattison, supra note 200,
at 20 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1637) (discussing the inclusive provisions that accommodate for individuals with varying abilities).
272. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 330.1637 (LexisNexis 2018) (the same due
process protections from an initial appointment are provided in subsequent hearings), with In
re Estate of Lemley, 9 Ark. App. 140, 143, 653 S.W.2d 141, 143 (1983) (the court acknowledged that where, once established, incompetency is presumed until sufficiently rebutted).
273. See Crane, supra note 60, at 188 (pointing out that supported decision-making systems are not legally recognized, which prevents this alternative from being a practical option).
274. Id. at 187 (listing some alternatives); Salzman, supra note 12, 171–72. See also ARK.
CODE ANN. § 28-65-213 (Repl. 2012) (requiring the court to determine the “feasibility of less
restrictive alternatives”).

2020]

A NEW GUARDIAN ANGLE

307

legal recognition of alternatives.275 The supported-decision based model
needs legal acknowledgment to be practical as an alternative to formal
guardianship.276
Arkansas should legally recognize decisions made using a supported
decision-making model.277 Without a legally recognized alternative, people
are forced to choose between traditional guardianship or the risk of having
unmet needs.278 The state should conduct research on alternatives and modifications to guardianships to determine which approaches will best serve
Arkansans. The state can promote alternatives and empowerment by increasing access to community-based supports.279 Reformation must include
measures to legally recognize preferred alternatives. Arkansas should adopt
and promote public policy that acknowledges an individual’s right to selfdetermination and alternatives must be legally recognized.280
E.

Implementation of Comprehensive Reforms Will Require Action,
Training, and Oversight

There are difficulties inherent to changes of any large, well-established
system.281 New concepts may even initially seem to be accepted but, in reality, these concepts essentially become the original system with a different
name.282 New standards must be implemented through intentional action,
extensive training, and continuous oversight.283 Alternative options to guardianship must be known and available to those seeking support.284 Information sharing must not rely on a generic list of options; it must provide

275. See Crane, supra note 60, at 188 (discussing systematic changes needed to enable
success of alternatives to traditional guardianships).
276. Id.
277. Id. See generally Dinerstein, supra note 16, at 455 (discussing trends toward the use
of alternatives to guardianship for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities).
278. Crane, supra note 60, at 188–89. See also NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note
13, at 123–29 (discussing supports for people with disabilities based on the area in need of
support); id. at 141–58 (comparing the opinions of people with disabilities, families, guardians, and professionals about guardianship and alternatives).
279. Crane, supra note 60, at 180.
280. See generally Devi, supra note 141, at 803 (discussing CRPD’s recognition of the
right to exercise legal capacity without discrimination based on diagnosis).
281. See generally Bruce A. Arrigo, Paternalism, Civil Commitment and Illness Politics:
Assessing the Current Debate and Outlining a Future Direction, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 131, 168
(1993) (discussing obstacles that inhibit change in large systems).
282. See generally A. Frank Johns, Person-Centered Planning in Guardianship: A Little
Hope for the Future, 2012 UT. L. REV. 1541, 1558 (discussing support and acceptance of new
concepts that sometimes results in a failure to implement meaningful changes).
283. Id. at 1557–61.
284. Crane, supra note 60, at 203.
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meaningful consideration of all less restrictive options before guardianship
is considered.
State representatives should be trained to promote individual freedoms
using the recognized alternatives available.285 State actors, as well as other
advocates, must make active and consistent efforts to promote independence
through empowerment rather than substitutive or controlling methods.286
Though not directly involved in the guardianship process, the Division of
Developmental Disabilities Services (DDS)287 is in the best position to supply information and resources to people in need of support. DDS already
provides information and oversight to people with developmental disabilities receiving or seeking support services.288 The values and underlying motivations of alternatives to guardianships are consistent with the mission of
DDS, which includes protecting constitutional rights of people with disabilities.289 DDS could oversee the efficacy of alternatives to guardianship and
provide additional supports, if necessary. Through information-sharing and
statutory reforms, Arkansas can promote independence while still providing
necessary protection to people with disabilities.
V. CONCLUSION
The current trend in civil rights seeks to empower people with intellectual and developmental disabilities by favoring alternatives to traditional
guardianship. Arkansas’s statutory model minimally reflects the societal
shift toward a support-based model of advocacy. Significant statutory
changes are necessary to create meaningful change in current guardianship
standards. Arkansas should adopt new policies and incorporate systematic
initiatives for people who need decision-making assistance. Arkansas should
join other states in leading the country toward a more progressive view of
advocacy and empower Arkansans who would otherwise be encumbered by
a guardianship.
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285. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 13, at 92–93 (discussing the systematic use of guardianship and promotion from teachers and school administrators).
286. See SIMPLICAN, supra note 14, at 122–25 (discussing an “alliance,” rather than traditional advocacy, to empower to prevent overshadowing the person supported).
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